The Director General, Fidel Sendagorta, focuses his speech on the change in China’s strategy and the exercise of power, in a context where International Relations are increasingly based on unilateral actions, economic or other forms of coercion, widespread rearmament, and a rise in nationalism, which increases friction and, therefore, the risk of conflict. For now, this is still seen as something distant, with China rising as the new economic power after having multiplied its economy by 20 in the last twenty years.

However, Sendagorta reminds us that this economic leadership is not new. China was the world’s leading economic power at the beginning of the 19th century. The novelty is that, while back then the country had no interest in exercising economic or military leadership outside of Asia, today’s China needs international trade and investment for its economic growth and is capable of projecting its power—not only economically but also politically and militarily—in regions where it was previously underrepresented.

In this regard, the Chinese strategy, like all others, has both a public and a secret component. China’s public strategy focuses on two goals: to position itself at the forefront of the technology sector through what is known as the New Silk Road, renamed by China as ‘the Belt and Road,’ and to promote integration of the infrastructure across the entire Eurasian continent and its maritime front in the Pacific. The ultimate goal is to achieve economic integration where all the economies in the region increase their dependence on the Chinese market.

Regarding the hidden aspect of its strategy, Sendagorta clarifies that some authors find it a mystery to answer the question, «How far does China want to go in its global rise?» while others consider it public knowledge that this goal is for China to become the power that leads the international system by 2049, the centenary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China.

As for the reason behind China’s change in attitude, the Director General explains that it can be attributed, on one hand, to the decline and retreat of the United States, with public opinion unwilling to engage in conflicts that do not require clear U.S. involvement; the increase in China’s economic independence, which, due to its growing middle class, boasts a colossal internal market; and the nationalist ideology, which increasingly occupies a significant part of its collective imagination.

However, despite its leadership strategy, China has strategic weaknesses that its current policy seeks to compensate for. Among these, Fidel Sendagorta highlights that it is surrounded by powers with which it has been at war in recent decades. On the other hand, its increasing dependence on maritime routes explains its strategy to erode relations between the U.S. and its allies in the region through China’s dominance of the new Silk Road, as well as its anti-access military doctrine.

The United States, for its part, initially focused its policy toward China in commercial terms but has shifted to a more ambitious policy, with China as a strategic rival, and focused on the technological field, which is where strategic leadership is at stake. According to Sendagorta, this is because «most cutting-edge technologies are dual-use. On one hand, they are the foundation of the new economy, but they also have a defense component. Whoever dominates these new technologies could end up making a technological leap equivalent to the one the United States made with the possession of the atomic bomb.» Therefore, the struggle between the U.S. and China over 5G and the technological decoupling is not so much about espionage but about the strategic advantage it would give China, in the event of a conflict, if its companies controlled the networks, granting them the ability to shut down entire sectors of a country’s economy.

Regarding Europe’s reaction, which Sendagorta considers late but notable, it has been based on increasing control over Chinese investments and commercial activities in third countries and developing an industrial and technological policy capable of competing with the Asian giant, viewing China in a more defensive manner.

However, the strategic rivalry between China and the U.S. also means that the U.S. will increasingly disconnect from European security. Therefore, Fidel Sendagorta considers it essential for Europe to develop its strategic autonomy, a concept that increasingly, as demonstrated by the pandemic, goes beyond a military approach and also focuses on other areas such as resilience.

Sofía Alfayate
Communication Assistant, INCIPE